To What Extent is it Permissible to Incorporate Social Values into Legal Legislation?

Volume 11|Issue 49| Summer 2024 |Theme of the Issue

Abstract

​This research paper examines the mechanisms of achieving equity through criminal jurisprudence in philosophy and law. It discusses equity as an ethical-social and criminal justice concept from the standpoint of analytical philosophy. We also consider the ethics of praise and blame as developed by Peter Strawson, which are reactions of approval or disapproval. However, we will explore the normative validity of relying on social values and the extent to which these values can underpin criminal law. This has led legal philosophers to transform the issue of legal regulation of disapproval, disgust, or condemnation into a distinctly philosophical subject.

The ethical and legal system is based on a sharp and definitive separation between the rational human and the instinctual animal. Nietzsche, however, believes that a significant portion of feelings of disapproval, nausea, aversion, and disgust do not require legal and ethical regulation with varying degrees of criminalization and punishment. Most of these reactive impressions are culturally derived from society rather than from nature. This insight remains the subject of deep examination in contemporary moral philosophy and its legal and criminal regulation.


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​Professor of Analytical Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Fez.

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