On the Hegelian Reconciliation Between Freedom and Law

Our research revolves around Hegel's philosophy of law, specifically focusing on the problematic relationship between freedom and law in his thought. It is well-known that Hegel developed a distinctive conception of law, differing from the modern political philosophy in several aspects. In this study, we are particularly interested in two interconnected issues: the source of law and the relationship between law and freedom. According to Hegel, law does not originate from natural rights; nature, in his dialectic, does not bestow rights. The giver of rights is objective reason; laws and constitutions are manifestations of this reason's activity throughout history. This implies that law is not a theoretical construct of individual human reason but rather positive legislation derived from universal reason. This universal reason is not an individual human intellect that can be accused of tyranny; it is a collective reason, in the Hegelian sense, as a synthesis where the contradiction between individual subjects dissolves.

Hegel posits that universal reason exists, evidenced by its activity throughout history. It is not an enemy of our individual minds but an expression of them in a grander form: the historical trajectory of reason in its entirety. Therefore, the laws produced by this reason do not oppose individual freedoms; rather, they embody them. Any conflict between freedom and law, for Hegel, is essentially a conflict between the universal and the particular.

One of the most notable philosophies that articulate the conflict between the universal and the particular is Kant's philosophy, particularly in his view of the relationship between freedom and law.


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Our research revolves around Hegel's philosophy of law, specifically focusing on the problematic relationship between freedom and law in his thought. It is well-known that Hegel developed a distinctive conception of law, differing from the modern political philosophy in several aspects. In this study, we are particularly interested in two interconnected issues: the source of law and the relationship between law and freedom. According to Hegel, law does not originate from natural rights; nature, in his dialectic, does not bestow rights. The giver of rights is objective reason; laws and constitutions are manifestations of this reason's activity throughout history. This implies that law is not a theoretical construct of individual human reason but rather positive legislation derived from universal reason. This universal reason is not an individual human intellect that can be accused of tyranny; it is a collective reason, in the Hegelian sense, as a synthesis where the contradiction between individual subjects dissolves.

Hegel posits that universal reason exists, evidenced by its activity throughout history. It is not an enemy of our individual minds but an expression of them in a grander form: the historical trajectory of reason in its entirety. Therefore, the laws produced by this reason do not oppose individual freedoms; rather, they embody them. Any conflict between freedom and law, for Hegel, is essentially a conflict between the universal and the particular.

One of the most notable philosophies that articulate the conflict between the universal and the particular is Kant's philosophy, particularly in his view of the relationship between freedom and law.


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