Darwish argues that the idea of “justice as recognition” may provide the basis for a comprehensive theory of justice. This requires an examination of the conceptual and linguistic connotations of the concept of recognition, in addition to a review of its historical and contemporary theories, particularly in the works of Rousseau, Smith, Fichte, and Hegel. To this end, the essay discusses the concept of justice in relation to other notions: equality, need, competence, freedom, rights and law, relationships with the other, dependence on the other, the good, and so on. It argues for the need to treat all of these relationships from a new conceptual angle, that of recognition, a concept that has reached a great degree of complexity and depth; an entire philosophical tradition serves as the foundation for this concept, and is simultaneously based upon it. The paper then moves on to discuss the concept of recognition itself, and examines the semantic connotations of the word in Arabic, as well as its meaning in English, French, and German. It then elaborates on the meanings of this concept and its usages in contemporary philosophy and thought. The paper argues that this broad concept, with its various usages, includes a certain unity that allows the three main currents that employ it to be considered as a whole: social relations, or the distribution of the forms of social recognition among individuals; legal relations, or questions of property, citizenship, and civic belonging; and interpersonal relations, or relations of love, friendship and family.