Legal Positivism and the Relativity of Values: Rights and Justice Between Hans Kelsen and Norberto Bobbio

Volume 11|Issue 49| Summer 2024 |Theme of the Issue

Abstract

The aim of this study is not to chronicle how philosophers of law have approached the concept of justice, but rather to examine legal philosophy's unique approach to this concept in the contemporary context by considering perspectives that emerged from the debate with its proponents. Specifically, this study discusses the interpretations of Kelsen's legal positivism by both Bobbio and Perelman. The choice of these figures is deliberate, as each represents a foundational paradigm in contemporary legal philosophy. Kelsen epitomizes the purest form of legal positivism, whereas Bobbio represents a paradigm that, while methodologically rooted in positivism, diverges in its understanding of the content of law and associated concepts like justice and human rights. Bobbio emphasizes the logical-linguistic analysis of major legal concepts central to practical reason, as evident in his treatment of justice, equality, human rights, and democracy. Perelman, on the other hand, goes further in critiquing the positivist conceptions of law and justice (despite his positivist origins), advocating for a paradigm of argumentative reason grounded in the rationality and legal logic of judges. This approach marks a rhetorical turn in the philosophical discourse on justice.

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​Professor of Political Philosophy, Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco.

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