Within the ongoing debate about deliberative democracy, Jürgen Habermas's arguments have gained prominence, not only in critiquing this new form of democratic practice but also in addressing the challenges it faces and the discussions it has sparked in contemporary political philosophy. The significance and centrality of Habermas' conceptualization necessitate a careful examination of the argument upon which it is based and the concept of deliberation it relies on. It is crucial to explore the content and limitations of this conceptualization to construct an objective assessment: Did Habermas present a viable conceptualization of deliberative democracy that could serve as a reliable alternative to the representational model? Does the deliberative approach, as formulated by Habermas, raise more challenges than the solutions it proposes? Why did the path which relies on consensus lead to the formulation of a philosophical justification for civil disobedience? To answer these questions, this paper briefly outlines the features of this conceptualization and then explores the challenges it faces, stemming from both its argumentative construction and its practical effectiveness, in an effort to make an objective evaluation.